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I. Introduction
The Florida Legislature in 1984 will once again revisit the state's
juvenile dependency laws in their entirety. These are the laws which
deal in the civil context with abused, neglected, abandoned, truant,
runaway and ungovernable children and are contained in Chapter 39
and section 409.168, Florida Statutes.' The Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS) Subcommittee on Health, Economic and Social Ser-
vices of the Florida House of Representatives has drafted and passed
Proposed Committee Bill 22 which extensively revises the present de-
pendency provisions of these two statutes.
Such major effort gives pause to look back at Florida's previous
efforts to forge realistic dependency standards, to look at the previous
efforts of other states and Congress, and to look forward to the in-
formed legislative decisionmaking Florida must now make. Observers
and participators in Florida's dependency process approach the search
for standards from different perspectives: children's rights; parents'
rights; state interests; fiscal constraints; religious implications; and po-
litical considerations. When issues concern children, particularly chil-
dren at risk, the debate is often filled with emotion and fraught with
legal and social dilemmas. This article discusses the state of Florida's
role in the lives of dependent children from the perspective of family
autonomy, preservation and reunification. It looks first at previous
quests for realistic standards in dependency law by summarizing the
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I. Other Florida laws related to the dependency process but not discussed in this
article are: FLA. STAT. §§ 409.145-409.166; 415.101-415.513 (1983).
2. The Subcommittee passed this on October 31, 1983. The bill has been filed as
H.B. 399. Its Senate companion bill is S.B. 273.
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work of certain legal and social work commentators and analyzing the
constitutional basis for family preservation standards. Part III exam-
ines both Congressional efforts to develop federal family preservation
standards and Florida's previous reform efforts. The article concludes
with a discussion of those crucial family preservation issues which Flor-
ida currently faces and how these can be resolved.
II. The Past Search for Realistic Standards
The origin of the present dependency system which mandates state
intervention in family life whenever a child is abused, neglected, aban-
doned, or in need of supervision lies in the state's historical role of
parens patriae,3 and in its police powers.4 This intervention system his-
torically was managed through juvenile courts and public social welfare
agencies. The original statutory dependency framework was established
to provide work or training for poor children and to minimize welfare
costs and fraud. Much later, the development of Aid to Dependent
Children and new awareness of the special needs of children resulted in
a statutory dependency process that became much less a financial assis-
tance program and much more a system in which the state served as
the arbiter of acceptable parental behavior. The patchwork nature of
old dependency laws and their intent to serve these divergent purposes
led to increasing concern in the mid-1970s, a concern which continues
to the present. The dilemma centers around the limits of state interven-
tion in family life and the search for realistic standards that provide
certainty to decision-makers, and at the same time produce more good
than harm to children and families.
A. Legal and Social Work Commentary
The leading proponent of the need for workable standards in the
dependency process is Michael Wald, an attorney, who in a pair of
articles written in the 1970s set forth both his proposed standards and
3. Literally "parent of the country," parens patriae refers to the sovereign power
of guardianship over persons under disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed.
1951).
4. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEORGETOWN L.J. 887 (1975) and
R. DE LONE, SMALL FUTURES (1979).
5. Areen, supra note 4, at 917.
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his rationale for their viability.' Wald articulated the need for the nar-
rowing of child neglect laws, arguing that in a society which values
individual and family autonomy and privacy, it is preferable to solve
family problems through noncoercive intervention. The remedy of coer-
cive intervention, Wald emphasized, will do more harm than good to
children and families.7 In a second article, Wald developed a model
rule-oriented dependency law and argued that specific value judgments
about family intervention should be made at the legislative level, rather
than in the courts.8 The key problems Wald saw in the dependency
process in 1976 were: 1) lack of adequate funding for noncoercive in-
tervention services and reunification services; and 2) laws and adminis-
trative processes that did not reflect and facilitate a set of consistent
goals for intervention.9 The result, Wald felt, was an existing statutory
system that focused on parental behaviors rather than harm to the
children.1 °
In elaborating on the weaknesses of the child welfare system,
Wald pointed to substantial evidence that state intervention is harmful,
not beneficial, to children and parents."' Most children are strongly at-
tached to their parents whether "fit" or "unfit." Another problem dis-
cussed by Wald was the application of neglect standards in an arbi-
trary, discriminatory way, with neglect standards being applied more
stringently to poor families than to middle class families. Wald feared
the massive reallocation of children to new parents under the 1970s
standards. 2 As a more realistic approach, Wald suggested an interven-
tion system in which standards for final termination of parental rights
are related to standards for initial removal of children from their
homes and to standards for return of children to their homes. He sum-
marized his proposals as follows:
6. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wald I];
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children Standards for Removal
of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Wald II].
7. Wald I, supra note 6, at 987-1005.
8. Wald II, supra note 6, at 649-52.
9. Id. at 627-28.
10. Id. at 629.
11. Id. at 644-45.
12. Id. at 651.
1984]
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I propose that neglect statutes be revised to allow intervention only
when a child has suffered or is likely to suffer certain serious
harms. When intervention is needed to protect a child, the child
should be left in her home unless she cannot be protected from the
specific harm justifying intervention without removal. If a child
must be removed, intensive services should be provided to reunite
the family and the child should be returned when she will no longer
be endangered in her home, not when it is in her 'best interest' to
return. However, to prevent children from remaining in imperma-
nent foster care, parental rights should be terminated and a perma-
nent placement provided for most children under age three at the
time of removal after six months of placement if the child cannot
be returned home at that time. For children over three termination
would occurP if they cannot be returned home after one year in
placement.1 3
A formulation similar to the Wald proposals was offered even ear-
lier by commentator Robert Mnookin.14 He maintains that three prin-
ciples should govern state intervention in family life and the removal of
children from their homes: 1) removal should be a last resort, used only
when the child cannot be protected within the home; 2) the decision to
require foster care placement should be based on legal standards that
can be applied in a consistent and even-handed way, and not be pro-
foundly influenced by the values of the particular deciding judge; 3) if
removal is necessary, the state should actively seek, when possible, to
help the child's parents overcome the problems that led to removal so
that the child can be returned home as soon as possible. In cases where
the child cannot be returned home in a reasonable time, despite efforts
by the state, the state should find a stable alternative arrangement such
as adoption for the child. A child should not be left in foster care for an
indefinite period of time.15 Mnookin was troubled by the use of only the
vague best interests standard when making decisions as to state inter-
vention in family life. Society's knowledge of human behavior provides
no reliable predictors of future abuse and neglect, and thus courts lack
substantial predictive information. Our pluralistic society, Mnookin ar-
gues, lacks consensus about child-rearing strategies and values, and
13. Id. at 637-38. These proposals are explained in detail, id. at 700-06.
14. Mnookin, Foster Care: In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. ED. REV. 599
(1973).
15. Id. at 602.
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thus courts are left to rely on personal values.1 6 The lack of consistent
standards makes it too easy to ignore detriments to removing children
and children separated from natural parents suffer "separation
trauma". 17 Finally the best interests standard ignores parental
interests.18
Judith Areen has proposed several principles which balance the in-
terests of child, parent, and state:191) standards for court intervention
in a family should focus on the emotional and physical needs of the
children rather than on parental fault; 2) decisions on whether and how
to intervene in a family situation should serve to enhance the social and
emotional bonds.of that family, 3) courts should require a permanent
placement for any child who has been removed from his family and
who cannot be returned safely within a period of time that is reasona-
ble in view of the age and needs of the child.2°The reasons for the
Areen principles are similar to those of Wald and Mnookin: history has
indicated that the enhancement of family ties is normally the best way
to protect the best interests of children;21 separation of children and
parents can be harmful to a child's emotional development whatever
the fault of the parent;2 2 and the most prevalent characteristic of fami-
lies charged with neglect is poverty.2 3
The need for narrower and more specific statutory standards in the
dependency process has been urged from a social worker viewpoint as
well as the legal viewpoint. Douglas Besharov very recently referred to
the problem of increasing liability, both civil and criminal, because of
the failure of social workers to properly investigate and treat child
abuse and neglect cases.24 Inadequate funding of social services has
meant that the number of child welfare staff required to serve abused
16. Id. at 615-22.
17. Id. at 623.
18. Id. at 614-15.
19. Areen, supra note 4, at 918.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 919.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 888. See also Gartison, Why Terminate Parental Rights? 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423 (1983).
24. Besharov, Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social
Work? 9 FAMILY LAW REP. 4029 (1983). See G.L. v. Zumwalt, 564 F. Supp. 1030
(W.D. Mo. 1983) (consent decree) for an example of such a liability suit. See also
National Center for Youth Law, Sweeping Consent Decree Protects Rights of Foster
Children, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 555 (1983).
1984]
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and neglected children has not kept pace with the reports of suspected
incidences of dependency.2 5 Besharov maintains that existing depen-
dency laws are too broad to set the ground rules for appropriate deci-
sionmaking by social service agencies charged with the duties of inves-
tigation and treatment. Existing laws place too much responsibility for
decisionmaking on social workers, charging them with the burden of
making sophisticated predictions of parental failure, when the predic-
tive capacity of the social sciences makes it impossible to show with
any degree of certainty whether a particular parent will abuse or neg-
lect a child.26 Besharov suggests that existing laws be redrafted to deal
only with past abusive and neglectful behavior with only very narrow
exceptions. He recommends that dependency laws legislate on serious
harm to children, but avoid dealing with minor assualts or marginally
inadequate care.27
Anne Selinske, a social worker, agrees that the increased demand
for services has overloaded the child welfare system and the increase
has not been matched with additional resources.28 Her solution to this
critical problem is the passage of legislation delineating the children
who need help the most and determining how services are to be pro-
vided to them. Existing dependency laws, Selinske maintains, have not
sufficiently limited the situations justifying invervention.29
The basic weaknesses in state care of children was even recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in 1977 in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families (OFFER).30 The Court found a disproportionate re-
sort to foster care by the poor and victims of discrimination, due partly
to the disruptive effect of poverty on family stability but partly to the
fact that middle and upper income families purchase private care for
their children. 31 "The poor have little choice but to submit to state-
supervised care when family crises strike. '3 2 The Court also noted the
"hostility of agencies to the efforts of natural parents to obtain the re-
25. Besharov, supra note 24, at 4031.
26. Id. at 4032 (citing the U.S. National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect,
Review of Child Abuse Research: 1979-81).
27. Id. at 4034.
28. Selinske, Protecting CPS Clients and Workers, 41 PUBLIC WELFARE 31
(1983).
29. Id. at 32-3.
30. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
31. Id. at 834.
32. Id.
[Vol. 8
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turn of their children" and gave various explanations for this hostility.33
Studies show that social workers of middle class backgrounds tend to
favor placement with generally higher status families, thus reflecting a
bias that treats the natural parents' poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial
to the best interests of the child.3' Other problems discussed by the
Court include lack of staff to provide social work services to enable
natural parents to resolve their problems and prepare for return of the
child, and agency policies which discourage involvement of the natural
parent in the care of the child.3 5
All these comments have in common the recognition of the fallibil-
ity of human services, the limitations of funding, the lack of predictive
capacity, and the disruptive effect of poverty. They give cause for cau-
tion in the drafting of dependency statutes, and urge the need for clar-
ity, specificity and narrowness.
B. The Constitutional Basis for Family Preservation Standards
Not only have legal and social work commentators and the United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. OFFER recognized the importance
of family autonomy and preservation as a paramount value in Ameri-
can society, but the principle has also been firmly established as a man-
date of constitutional law. The Supreme Court's decisions in the field of
family law show three distinct lines of analysis that are relevant to pro-
posed legislation on dependency: 1) family autonomy 2) family privacy
and 3) the requirements of family preservation. While these lines over-
lap, a separate discussion of each will assist in the later analysis of the
Proposed Committee Bill 2.
1. Family Autonomy.
The state's interest in promoting family autonomy derives from its
parens patriae objective of ensuring the welfare of children and its po-
lice power goal of promoting the strength and stability of society. There
are, however, definite constitutional limits on the state's power to con-
trol the substantive values and beliefs of its citizens.36 The United
States Constitution strictly limits the state's power to impose on its citi-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. n.35.
36. Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1213 (1980).
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zens any particular moral, religious, or ethical values although any in-
dividual is free to hold such views. In that sense, families are constitu-
tionally autonomous. Thus in Pierce v. Society of Sisters the Supreme
Court held that the state may not standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public school teachers only.37 The
Court pointed out that "[t] he child is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions."3 In Meyers v. Nebraska, the Court held that the state may not
foster a homogeneous people with American ideals by forbidding the
teaching of foreign languages to young children. 9 Wisconsin v.
Yoder,40 stands out as a particularly poignant reminder of the weight
of family autonomy. In this case the Court acknowledged that the in-
terest of the state in providing a system of compulsory public education
is a "paramount" concern. 41 It might even be said that the best inter-
ests of Amish children required their participation in the American
educational mainstream.4 12 But the Court firmly emphasized that the
state interest in protecting children must still be balanced against the
fundamental rights of parents, and thus the Court refused to enforce
the law requiring compulsory school attendance until the age of
sixteen.43
A compelling recent decision is Bellotti v. Baird, in which the Su-
preme Court discussed parental ability to regulate a child's abortion."
The Court stated that "affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, re-
ligious or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to at-
tempt in a society constitutionally committed to individual liberty and
freedom of choice."'4 5 In short, the limits placed on the state's police
power by the Constitution and the mandates of family autonomy pre-
vent the state from imposing social norms and moral values on families
and accord parents the dominant role in childrearing and childbearing
decisions.4" Any standards of parental fitness, therefore, must remain
37. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
38. Id. at 535.
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
40. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41. Id. at 213.
42. Id. at 229.
43. Id. at 213.
44. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
45. Id. at 638.
46. Note, supra note 36, at 1216.
[Vol. 8
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sensitive to the principle of family autonomy.
2. Family Privacy
A second line of constitutional cases deals with the right to family
privacy concerning intimate family activities. Prince v. Massachusetts
mentioned a private realm of family life which the state connot enter.47
Skinner v. Oklahoma invalidated a state statute providing for
mandatory sterilization of persons convicted of three or more selected
felonies.48 Griswold v.Connecticut struck down a state statute forbid-
ding the use of contraceptives.49 Roe v. Wade overturned a state statute
prohibiting non-therapeutic abortions.50 Eisenstadt v. Baird51 struck
down a state statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to unmarried
persons. In Eisenstadt, the Court said: "if the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child. ' 52
The right of privacy has been expanded to the right of extended
families to live together. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland53 the Su-
preme Court invalidated a local ordinance which defined "family", so
as to exclude Moore's grandchildren from living with her in subsidized
housing. The Court explained, "[b]ut when the government intrudes on
choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must ex-
amine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion."" Thus the Supreme Court has clearly established that individu-
als have a group of rights related to intimate family decisions. The
state can not advance a countervailing interest that is compelling
enough to interfere with these rights.
3. State Intervention and Family Preservation
The final area of constitutional concern deals with the state's abil-
ity to intervene in family life to affect a decision about the person with
47. 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52. Id. at 453.
53. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
54. Id. at 499.
19841
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whom a child shall live. This line of cases has occasionally dealt with
private party custody disputes but has more often focused on disputes
between the state and private parties. Because of the fundamental right
to family integrity and family privacy, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the right to care, custody and control by a parent is a recip-
rocal right of the parent and the child. The Court stated, in Stanley v.
Illinois,55 that the issues of competency and care are important issues
for both parent and child,56 and, in Ford v. Ford,57 that the question of
with whom the child resides is "vital to a child's happiness and well-
being.""B
The Supreme Court has recognized the differing constitutional
rights of parents who reside with their children and those who do not.
Parental rights are at their pinnacle when parent and child live to-
gether in an intact domestic unit. Thus in Stanley v. Illinois,59 the
Court held that a single, widowed father who lives with his children has
a due process right to a hearing before a child can be removed from the
home.60 In contrast, the Court held in Quilloin v. Walcott6 l that an
unwed father who did not reside with his children did not have a con-
stitutional right to withhold consent to their adoption by the stepfather
with whom they lived.6 2
In Smith v. OFFER63 the Supreme Court faced for the first time
the issue of the right of natural parents to family integrity, contrasted
with the interests of the foster parents in continued custody of the fos-
ter children and the state's interest in protecting the child. Even after
the family has been separated, the liberty interest of natural parents in
family privacy rests on a higher plane than the rights of any other indi-
vidual, because:
its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in
intrinsic human rights. Any emotional ties that may develop be-
tween a foster parent and a child--or arguably between a legal
custodian and a child-are of less constitutional significance than
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
56. Id. at 657.
57. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
58. Id. at 193.
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
60. 405 U.S. at 658.
61. 434 U.S. 246 (1977).
62. 434 U.S. at 256.
63. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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the ties between natural parents and children because the former
are relationships created by the State and in which the State has
been a partner from the outset."
The Smith decision recognizes for the first time the inchoate substan-
tive due process rights to future custody of natural parents whose chil-
dren have been removed from their homes. 5 It also reinforces the con-
stitutional distinction between family rights when the state is an
intervenor as opposed to family rights when only private parties are
involved.
Although a parent may lose temporary custody of a child, the par-
ent does not lose the right to family integrity. The Supreme Court
noted in Santosky v. Kramer6 6 that "[t]he fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State."6 7 While par-
ents retain their fundamental family rights even after removal of the
child, the state's interest is distinct.68 When the state has reason to
believe that a positive nurturing parent-child relationship still exists the
state has an interest in preservation of the family unit .6 But when it is
clear that the natural parent cannot or will not provide a normal family
home then the state's interest is in finding the child an alternative per-
manent home.70 The limitations on state intervention through its parens
patriae powers lie in the lack of constitutional permission to separate
children from fit parents and in the recognition that even parents who
are separated from their children have a right to future custody. Be-
cause these are fundamental rights, the state may pursue its protective
powers only when a compelling state interest has been demonstrated
and only when the least drastic alternatives are used.",
64. 431 U.S. at 845.
65. Note, The Fundamental Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New
York Foster Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63, 64 (1977).
66. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
67. 455 U.S. at 753.
68. 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1984]
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III. Statutory Responses to the Search for Realistic Standards
Progress has been made to ameliorate the patchwork nature of this
country's dependency system and to implement constitutional law.
These efforts have come from both federal legislation and through re-
form efforts in the Florida legislature.
A. The Federal Response: The Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980
In the late 1970s Congress studied problems related to foster care,
and the public welfare systems which served children. Child welfare
advocates articulated many of the weaknesses identified by Wald,
Mnookin, Areen, which were discussed in Part II of this article. Until
1980, federal government participation in public child welfare systems
serving dependent children was largely limited to funding provided
through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) foster
care program under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act.72 This pro-
gram provided federal funds to reimburse some of the costs of foster
care for "eligible" children, primarily those from poor families. This
form of federal financial assistance encouraged court-ordered place-
ment in foster care, even though other federal monies were available
for foster care related services and general child welfare services.73
However, no uniform federal standard existed to encourage states to
provide services to prevent removal of children and to aid in reunifying
families with their children placed in foster care. In response, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Adoption Assistance Act) was enacted by Congress on
June 17, 1980.7" This is the first major federal effort to reform the
foster care system and to provide fiscal incentives to states to empha-
size the goals of prevention and reunification. This law imposes numer-
ous legal requirements on states to ensure that preventive efforts are
made to avoid separation of dependent children from their families,
that states are accountable for the status of children in foster care, and
that stays in foster care are as short as possible.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1976).
73. Title XX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1400 (1976) and Title IV-B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-
626 (1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 627-28 (Supp. V 1981) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-76 (Supp. V
1981). A detailed analysis of the Act is contained in A. ENGLISH, FOSTER CARE RE-
FORM (1981).
[Vol. 8
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The Act has several components. It creates a new Title IV-E76
governing foster care maintainence payments and adoption assistance
payments. It amends the child welfare services program under Title
IV-B.76 Title IV-E (Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption
Assistance) requires each state participating in the AFDC program to
develop a plan for meeting the new requirements of the Act as a condi-
tion for federal foster care funding.77 Each state's plan must include
the following components: 1) a judicial determination that continua-
tion in the home would be "contrary to the welfare of the child" prior
to placement in foster care;7 8 2) effective October 1, 1983, a judicial
determination that "reasonable efforts" have been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home, prior to
placement in foster care;79 3) case plans for each child discussing the
appropriateness of the particular placement, the services which will be
provided to facilitate the child's return home or other pernianent place-
ment, and the services which will be provided to the child;80 4) a case
review system to assure that the status of each child is reviewed at least
every six months "to determine the continuing necessity for and appro-
priateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case
plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviat-
ing or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care, and
to project a likely date by which the child may be returned home or
placed for adoption. . .";81 5) a dispositional hearing within eighteen
months of placement in foster care to determine the future status of the
child, 2 6) procedural safeguards as to parental rights pertaining to re-
moval of the child from the home, changes in placements, and decisions
affecting visitation rights;8 3 7) for voluntary placements in foster care,
a voluntary placement agreement which provides for return of the child
to the parents upon request, and limits the duration of voluntary place-
ments to six months, absent a judicial determination that the child
should not be returned home;8' 8) a fair hearing procedure before the
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-76 (Supp. V 1981).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 627-28 (Supp. V 1981).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 673 (Supp. V 1981).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 671(16) (Supp. V 1981); 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (Supp. V 1981).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(b) (Supp. V 1981).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (Supp. V 1981).
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. §672(g) (Supp. V 1981).
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state agency, for anyone denied benefits under the Act.8"
The requirement that reasonable efforts be made to prevent the
need for placement in foster care is a requirement which must be met,
not only by the state plan, but also in each individual case in which
federal funding is sought. This provision furthers the goal of preventing
removal frorri the home and gives the state a fiscal incentive to provide
preventive services. The requirements for case plans and case reviews
emphasize the goal of family reunification. By focusing on "alleviation
or mitigation" of the problems causing the placement in foster care, the
Act departs from the more subjective standard of "the best interests of
the child", and adds certainty and enforceability to legal standards for
returning the child home.
The amendments to Title IV-B (Child Welfare Services) con-
tained in the Act also further the goals of removal prevention, account-
ability for children in the state foster care system, and reunification of
natural families. Before its enactment, actual appropriations for child
welfare services never exceeded $56.5 million. 6 Although a broad ar-
ray of services were authorized under the program, services to prevent
removal and reunify families were not required. In fact, foster care was
defined as a §ervice under Title IV-B and many states used the bulk of
their IV-B funds to subsidize foster care maintenance payments. The
Adoption Assistance Act made a number of important changes in this
Title IV-B program. First, states are precluded from increasing the
amount of their child welfare services grant expended for foster care
maintainance above 1979 levels.8 ' Thus, additional appropriations
(which as of 1982 have reached $163 million)8 8 must be used for other
service programs. The specific guidelines for the use of additional funds
consist of a two-step process. The first set of requirements comes into
play when appropriations under Title IV-B exceed $141 million. 9 For
any year in which appropriations are at least that high, a state can only
receive its share of amounts over $141 million by meeting the following
guidelines: 1) conducting an inventory of all children who have been in
foster care for over six months to determine whether the child needs to
85. 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(12) (Supp. V 1981).
86. A. ENGLISH, supra note 74, at 38.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 623(c) (Supp. V 1981).
88. Interview with Abigail English, author of FOSTER CARE REFORM, in Orlando,
Fla. (April 28, 1983).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a) (Supp. V 1981). Florida self-certified that it met these
requirements as of Sept. 30, 1982.
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remain in care and what services are needed to allow the child to go
home or to be adopted, 902) implementing a statewide information sys-
tem documenting demographic data, location, and goals for each child
in foster care or who has been in care within the past 12 months,913)
implementing the case review system required by Title IV-E, for all
children in state-supervised care,92 and 4) establishing a program to
provide services designed to reunite children in foster care with their
natural families if possible, or to facilitate placement for adoption. 93
The second stage of the Title IV-B requirements becomes opera-
tive when appropriations for the program reach the level of $266 mil-
lion for two consecutive years. At that point, in addition to meeting all
of the first stage requirements, states must have a preplacement pre-
ventive service program in place geared toward preventing placements
in foster care and preserving the natural family unit. Any state not
meeting these requirements will only be eligible to receive its share of
$56 million, the 1979 child welfare program appropriation.9
While the Act clearly imposes affirmative duties upon states to im-
plement the law's protections as a condition for receipt of federal funds
and to oversee compliance, it is still too early to determine the extent to
which courts will allow individuals to enforce the requirements through
litigation. Questions such as whether the law creates a private right of
action, whether the law creates substantive rights, whether individuals
may assert those rights, and whether an administrative, state, or fed-
eral judicial forum is appropriate for asserting them have yet to be
resolved. 5
The first judicial decision interpreting the requirements of the
Adoption Assistance Act came in the case of Lynch v. King, 6 in which
a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction directed to the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services. The case involved al-
leged violations of the federal constitutional and statutory rights of
children who were subject to the agency's protective intervention. 97
Specific allegations included the failure to investigate suspected abuse
90. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1981).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 627(b) (Supp. V 1981).
95. English, Litigating Under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act in
FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (M. Hardin ed. 1983).
96. 550 F. Supp. 325 (D. Mass. 1982).
97. 550 F. Supp. at 329.
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and neglect, the failure to provide appropriate services to prevent the
need for foster care placement or to reunify foster children with their
natural families, and the failure to establish and review case plans for
children and their families.98 Although Lynch v. King was filed before
the requirements of the Adoption Assistance Act became effective, and
although the injunction was entered based on violations of the old law,
the court based its prospective injunctive relief upon the new Act's con-
ditions for continued federal funds, and required the Massachusetts
agency to implement the case plan and case review system contained in
Title IV-E.99 The court also placed limitations on social worker
caseloads, and required, as of October 1, 1983, that reunification ser-
vices be provided.100 Although the defendants have appealed the deci-
sion, it stands as authority for the existence of a cause of action to
enforce both Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Adoption Assistance Act.
B. Florida's Response: Reform Efforts
At the same time that Wald, Mnookin and Areen were requesting
more realistic dependency laws and Congress was studying foster care
reform, various state efforts were also underway to deal with the place-
ment of children in foster care and the regular review of their status. In
the 1970s and 1980s, before the case review requirements of the Adop-
tion Assistance Act were enacted, foster care review statutes had al-
ready been legislated in many states because of the belief that regular
judicial review of children in foster care would address some systemic
weaknesses and facilitate more rapid return of children to their own
homes. One of the first states to pass such legislation was New York.101
A research project which investigated the effects of New York foster
care review hearings on the rate of return home confirmed that such
reviews had accomplished the desired result. The study found a positive
correlation between agency caseworker services provided to the natural
family and the child's eventual return home.102
Through section 409.168, Florida Statutes, Florida enacted its first
judicial review statute in 1977, requiring regular judicial review hear-
98. 550 F. Supp. at 331-36.
99. 550 F. Supp. at 335-36.
100. Id.
101. N.Y. SOCIAL SERVICEs LAW § 392 (McKinney 1983).
102. See Festinger, The New York Court Review of Children in Foster Care, 54
CHILD WELFARE 211 (1975) and Festinger, The Impact of New York Court Review of
Children in Foster Care: A Follow-up Report, 55 CHILD WELFARE 515 (1976).
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ings, reports to the court and mandatory dispositional alternatives. This
initial statute was passed because:
The Legislature finds that 7 out of 10 children placed in foster care
do not return to their biological families after the first year and
that permanent homes could be found for many of these children if
their status were reviewed periodically and they were found eligible
for adoption. It is the intent of the Legislature, therefore, to help
ensure a permanent home for children in foster care by requiring a
periodic review and report on their status.10 3
In 1980, a legislative study by the House Health and Rehabilitative
Services Committee of children in foster care found that, despite this
noble intent, Florida still had 7,800 children who would remain in fos-
ter care over thirty months, an increase of two months over the 1979
figures.10 4 The same study found that adequate foster care case plans
were essential to the judicial review process. The study commented,
"[t]he need for foster care case plans within a tight time frame is nec-
essary if foster care is, in fact, ever to become truly a 'temporary'
placement for children. The utilization of a contract approach to foster
care has proven to be very workable in some states." 10 5
The legislature subsequently revised section 409.168, Florida Stat-
utes, and added section 39.41(6)(b) in 1980. Section 409.168 requires
written performance agreements as well as judicial reviews. A perform-
ance agreement is a court-ordered document that is prepared by the
social service agency in conference with the natural parents. The agree-
ment delineates what is expected of all parties and what must be ac-
complished before a child can be returned to the parent. Performance
agreements are required for all children who remain in foster care
longer than thirty days. Section 39.41(6)(b) provides that substantial
compliance with the terms of a performance agreement must result in
the return of a child to the custody of the natural parent. The hoped
for effect of this new legislation, according to the Committee Report,
was the folldwing:
103. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(1) (1977). The Florida First District Court of Appeal
has held that the requirements of § 409.168(1) are mandatory. Williamson v. State,
369 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pingrel v. Quaintance, 394 So. 2d 161
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
104. COMM. ON HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., FLA. HOUSE OF REP., H.R. 1648,
FOSTER CARE: IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS (1980).
105. Id. at 22.
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The proposed changes in both the permanent commitment sec-
tion of Chapter 39 and the report and judicial review section of
Chapter 409 attempt to bring greater focus on the timeliness of
preparing performance agreements to plan for the child entering
foster care and the need to have the agency, the natural parents,
and other involved parties to work together to help the family reu-
nite if at all possible or to move toward terminating parental rights
if feasible and moving toward placement of the child in a perma-
nent, stable family setting.
The changes also attempted to stress the importance of the judicial re-
view proceedings to the courts by removing the ability to waive the
hearing and by also requiring the agreements to be submitted to the
court.1 °'Florida's Juvenile Justice Act, Chapter 39, Florida Statutes
(1980), provides the statutory authority for the state to initially inter-
vene in family relationships and to place dependent children in the
homes of relatives or in foster care. In enacting this legislation, the
legislature expressly stated the purpose of the Chapter, indicating a
clear preference for maintaining and restoring the natural family.10 7 In
addition to Florida's Juvenile Justice Act, the legislature has mandated
that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) ad-
minister a program for dependent children and their families. The leg-
islature set forth the goals toward which the program was to be di-
rected and once again clearly indicated its preference for reunification
of the natural family.10 8 For some time, therefore, it has been the legis-
lative policy in Florida to recognize the importance of family reunifica-
tion and preservation as a goal. The concomitant search for realistic
standards has long been a legislative priority.
The issues raised by the foster care review legislation are begin-
ning to be addressed by Florida courts as the family reunification tools
begin to be enforced. Quaintance v. Pingree09 establishes the impor-
tance of having regular judicial reviews on a timely basis and interprets
the provisions of section 409.168 as mandatory. In re V.M.C.,110 hold-
ing that an out-of-state placement of a Florida foster child is not au-
thorized by statute, also establishes the principle that the dispositional
alternatives contained in section 409.168 are mandatory and exclusive.
106. Id. at 2.
107. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.001-39.516 (1979).
108. FLA. STAT. § 409.145 (1978).
109. 394 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. 369 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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The first case to trace at length the legislative history of section
409.168 and the policy implications of the foster care scheme chosen by
Florida is In re A.B.." This decision makes clear that the Florida leg-
islature in enacting Chapter 39 and section 409.168 replaced any com-
mon law best interests of the child standard with a specific set of statu-
tory requirements designed for reconciliation of children with their
natural parents whenever possible and their permanent placement in
adoptive homes when that is not possible. The decision emphasizes that
the legislative goal for Florida's foster children is permanence. This
goal can only be achieved if HRS has fulfilled its affirmative obligation
to design and carry out a meaningful performance agreement.
IV. Family Preservation Issues and Proposed Legislation For
Florida
Although much has been accomplished through federal and state
laws to improve the dependency process, a great deal remains to be
done. During its 1983 session, Florida's legislature addressed many of
these open issues and will address these problems again in the 1984
session. This section identifies the crucial family preservation issues
currently at stake in Florida, and suggests some ways these issues can
be resolved.
A. Compliance with the Adoption Assistance and Child Wel-
fare Act
In order for Florida to continue to receive federal foster care and
child welfare funds, Florida must meet the requirements of the federal
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.'112 While not all of the
Act's requirements require legislative changes, Florida's dependency
statute must be examined in light of the federal requirements to deter-
mine where changes are needed. The Proposed Committee Bill 2 ad-
dresses many of these issues in a positive manner. Florida law presently
requires proof of abandonment, abuse, or neglect.""3 Neglect, as de-
fined, precludes an adjudication of dependency if the reason for the
child's deprivation is poverty or "financial inability."" 4 An amendment
111. 9 FLA. L.W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
113. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(9) (1980).
114. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(26) (1980).
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contained in the proposed bill would modify the financial inability lan-
guage by permitting an adjudication of neglect in cases of financial
inability if "services were offered and rejected". This proposed change
is consistent with the goal of prevention and the requirements of the
Adoption Assistance Act that "reasonable efforts" be made to avoid
the need for placement in foster care." 5 In any event, a program of
preventive services may soon be required as a condition for receiving
additional funds under Title IV-B for the state of Florida. Earlier
drafts of Proposed Committee Bill 2 would have permitted an adjudica-
tion if services were offered and rejected and in the additional situation
when services for relief were merely unavailable. The unavailability
language, which is inconsistent with the goal of the federal law, has
been deleted from the proposed bill.
Federal law prohibits federal funding for a foster care placement,
absent a judicial finding as to "reasonable efforts" to prevent the place-
ment." 6 To bring Florida law into compliance, the Proposed Commit-
tee Bill 2 contains amendments which would insert the "reasonable ef-
forts" determination into the Florida statute, not only at the disposition
hearing when the placement is ordered, but also at earlier stages in the
proceeding. Thus, the judicial inquiry into preventive efforts would be-
gin at the detention stage, and if efforts have not been reasonable, the
court can order that services be provided to maintain the child in the
home. By inserting these requirements into the early stages of the pro-
ceedings, the proposed amendments adhere to the preventive goals of
the Adoption Assistance Act and are consistent with the constitutional
prohibition on separating children from fit parents.
The Title IV-E requirements for case plans and a case review sys-
tem are largely met by the judicial review and performance agreement
provisions of section 409.168, Florida Statutes. The performance agree-
ment should contain most of the substantive elements of a case plan.
Under current Florida law, the decision to return a foster child to his
home turns on improving the conditions which caused removal, as set
forth in the performance agreement." 7 The language in the Proposed
Committee Bill 2 uses the word "remediate" in establishing a standard.
This is consistent with the language of the federal statute which focuses
on "alleviating or mitigating" the problems causing foster care place-
115. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1980).
116. Id.
117. FLA. STAT. 409.168(3)(a)b.a. (1980).
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ment at the review hearing. 118 Any legislative changes which would
amend Florida's standard by shifting the focus away from the correc-
tion of the problems which caused the placement and toward a "best
interests" standard, could jeopardize Florida's receipt of federal funds.
Another amendment contained in the proposed bill requires an eighteen
month judicial review hearing. This would satisfy the Adoption Assis-
tance Act's requirement for a "disposition hearing" within eighteen
months.119 Current Florida law provides for an equivalent of the federal
disposition hearing only after twenty four months in foster care.1 20
These and other proposed legislative changes address most of the
requirements of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act which
necessitate statutory change. Other requirements of the Act, while ca-
pable of being met by HRS, should be considered for future legislative
action. For example, the statewide information system and the reunifi-
cation and prevention services programs funded under Title IV-B could
be the subject of specific legislation. Not only would such legislation
assure Florida's compliance with the Act but it would also strengthen
Florida's response to the challenge of designing a realistic and consis-
tent system for dependent children.
B. The Criteria for Removal and Return
Legal and social work commentators and the United States Su-
preme Court have in their separate approaches identified the need to
connect the statutory criteria for removal of children from their homes
and placement in substitute care with the criteria for their return home
or for their permanent placement if they cannot go home. Prior to 1980
this problem represented a glaring flaw in Florida law because the cri-
teria for disposition of dependent children were unclear. The Florida
Supreme Court in 1958 broadly interpreted Florida's juvenile depen-
dency law in Pendarvis v. State.21 The court stated that once a child
has lawfully been declared a dependent child, he becomes a ward of the
state and broad discretion is vested in the juvenile court to do whatever
it believes is in the best interests of the child. 22 The problems with this
interpretation from a practical point of view have been described by
118. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(b) (1980).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c) (1980).
120. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(b) (1980).
121. 104 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1958).
122. 104 So. 2d at 652.
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Mnookin. 23 The legal problems become evident by comparing the lan-
guage of Pendarvis to the constitutional limits imposed by Pierce v.
Society of Sisters,2 4 Bellotti v. Baird,1 24 Smith v. OFFER,"'6 and
Santosky v. Kramer.12 7
In 1980 the Florida legislature attempted to make the connection
between standards for removal and standards for reunification of fami-
lies by designing the performance agreement. The legislature provided
for the return of children if parents substantially complied with the
performance agreement and for permanent commitment if parents did
not."0 The performance agreement must contain a description of the
reasons for the placement of the child in foster care, the problems or
conditions of the natural home that necessitated removal and the
remediation which will determine the return of the child to the
home.1 29 It also must contain a statement of the specific actions to be
taken by the parents to eliminate or correct the identified problems or
conditions.130
While the statutory language appears clear on its face, there have
been serious problems in the implementation of this law. The lines have
been drawn between those forces committed to the concepts of family
reunification and permanence for children and those forces determined
to retreat to the vague best interest standard that allows a court to find
"better parents" for dependent children, the 1970s debate staged anew.
The Florida First District Court of Appeal in its comprehensive deci-
sion In re A.B.,"'1 has clarified the applicability of the simple best in-
terests test in state intervention cases. This decision establishes that the
goal of Florida's foster care system is not to search for a fuller life with
more desirable parents for a child.132 A passive system of relying upon
a judge's perception of the "best interest of the child' demands "more
wisdom than Solomon's and its discriminatory ramifications, penalizing
the poor by reparenting their children to more affluent candidates, are
123. See Mnookin, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
124. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
125. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
126. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
127. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982). See supra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
128. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(6)(b); 39.41(1)(f)l.d. (1980).
129. FLA. STAT. § 409.168(3)(a)6 (1980).
130. Id.
131. 9 FLA. L. W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
132. Id. at 44.
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distressingly evident. 13 3 Some of the debate and confusion, therefore,
has been laid to rest.
The Florida House of Representatives HRS Subcommittee on
Health, Economic and Social Services, furthermore, has addressed this
debate in Proposed Committee Bill 2 by defining more specifically the
concept of substantial compliance with the terms of a performance
agreement. The bill provides " '[s]ubstantial compliance' means that
the circumstances which caused the placement in foster care have been
remediated to the extent that the well being and safety of the child will
not be endangered upon the child being returned to the parent or
guardian." '134 The strength of this definition lies in the extent to which
it corrects the problems identified earlier in Parts II and III. It gives
certainty to social workers, courts, parents, and children. It deals with
serious harm to children and their endangerment. It adheres to consti-
tutional principles of family preservation and limitations on state inter-
vention in family life. It, finally, assures Florida's compliance with the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act for the purpose of receiv-
ing federal funds.
C. Poverty as a Standard for Dependency
The legal and social work commentators and the United States
Supreme Court have been sensitive about the extent to which the bur-
den of state intervention in family life falls disportionately upon the
poor and victims of discrimination. 35 In 1978 the Florida legislature
ameliorated this problem by defining "neglect" as requiring financial
ability136 and by defining abandonment as also requiring ability to sup-
port and communicate with a child.13 7 Difficult economic times and
cutbacks in federal funds have spurred the poverty debate again in
Florida. There is no financial assistance available in Florida for two-
parent families who have exhausted their financial resources. Yet some
trial courts persist in claiming the need to protect the children of the
unemployed and allege that children are better off in fostei care than
in these homes without means.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Proposed bill available from Fla.
H.R., HRS Subcommttee on Health, Eco. & Soc. Serv.
135. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982).
136. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(27) (1978).
137. Id.
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The Subcommittee on Health, Ecomonic and Social Services has
resolved this debate in Proposed Committee Bill 2 by broadening the
definition of neglect and abandonment and by modifying the require-
ments of financial ability and the ability to support and communicate.
The bill conditions an adjudication of neglect in cases of parental pov-
erty upon the offer and rejection of services to assist the family. The
more troublesome language of earlier drafts which refers only to the
offer of "available" services has been removed. This language evolved
after substantial debate and discussion. Lines were drawn between
those forces clearly committed to adjudications of dependency solely
for poverty reasons and those forces opposed to any such change in the
existing laws. Any effort to further weaken the statutory protection for
parents without financial ability would be subject to legal challenges.
In addition, such results would strike at the essence of a fundamentally
fair societal value system. Statutory provisions that make poverty a ba-
sis for state intervention between parent and child could violate the
equal protection and due process rights of the United States Constitu-
tion in their abrogation of the rights of family autonomy, family pri-
vacy, and family preservation.1 38 Such definitions would establish a cul-
tural value choice that poverty is per se unwholesome for children and
would establish the solution as removal of children from their homes
rather than providing financial subsistence for the families. The effects
on parents and children of "separation trauma" would be ignored and
social workers and resources are diverted from cases where children are
in grave danger. Cases of poverty are better solved elsewhere than in
the juvenile courts because there is no certain body of research that
children are fatally and inexorably harmed by growing up poor and the
proposed bull preserves this solution.
D. Right to Counsel for Parents in the Dependency Process
Perhaps the most pressing family preservation issue currently at
stake in Florida is that of the absolute right to counsel on an appointed
basis for indigent parents at every stage in the dependency process.
Currently each interest is represented in Florida dependency proceed-
ings except the accused parent. 39 Florida courts now use complex evi-
dence presented by child protection teams at adjudication. It is not un-
usual to see at least six professionals, including lawyers, HRS
138. Areen, supra note 4, at 930-32.
139. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.404(3), § 415.508 (1983).
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counselors, and psychologists marshalled against an unrepresented par-
ent standing alone. It should be recognized that the present proposed
revisions to Chapter 39 would make it easier to adjudicate neglect and
abandonment in the first instance because these definitions are ex-
panded. Thus an even greater death blow is dealt to the natural par-
ent's rights. At the very least, Proposed Committee Bill 2 makes the
dependency process even more complicated for the unsophisticated par-
ent to understand.
The Subcommittee on Health, Economic and Social Services has
recognized the importance of the right to counsel and has included pro-
visions for appointed counsel in its proposals. The reasons for support-
ing this provision are compelling. For example, on September 15, 1983,
the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an en bane
decision in Davis v. Page140 which has generated great confusion.
Twenty-four judges participated in the decision which concerned indi-
gent parents' due process rights to appointed counsel in state depen-
dency proceedings.1 41 Five judges held that the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services14 2
requires that the right to counsel in Florida dependency proceedings be
determined on a case-by-case basis. These five judges required the
court to apply the Matthews v. Eldridge1 43 three-pronged due process
test and determine in each case: 1) the parental issue at stake, includ-
ing the possiblity of the child remaining in his home or with relatives as
opposed to removal from the home and placement in foster care, 2) the
state's interest in an accurate and just decision, and 3) the risk that a
parent will be erroneously deprived of custody because the parent is not
represented by counsel. 44
One Fifth Circuit judge concurred with the above five but stated
that "due process will require counsel in most cases of this kind (unless
saved by a determination that the evidence was sufficiently great "that
the absence of counsel's guidance did not render the proceedings funda-
mentally unfair)."1 45 Eight judges ordered the entry of judgment for
the defendant judges, stating that the pleadings did not present a case
or controversy. No comment on the merits of right to counsel was made
140. 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983).
141. 714 F.2d at 513.
142. 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
143. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
144. 714 F.2d at 516-17.
145. Id. at 522.
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by these judges. 146 Eleven judges joined in dissenting from the order of
judgment for the defendants.147 In addition to finding a case or contro-
versy these judges would require an absolute right to counsel. The rea-
sons given for this right included: 1) adjudications of dependency are
different in nature from permanent commitment hearings; 2) initial
separation of parent and child involves an intact family unit with con-
stitutional rights to family integrity that are of greater constitutional
significance than those of families whose bonds have been severed; 3)
adjudications of dependency in Florida deal a "death blow" to parental
rights and have a lasting chill on the exercise of these rights; 4) certain
legal rights are lost if not asserted at the adjudicatory stage in depen-
dency proceedings; 5) initial adjudications stigmatize or sever the pre-
sumption that a parent is fit, a showing that can never fully be regained
by subsequent evidence produced at later stages; 6) the state's parens
patriae interest in child protection favors preservation not severance of
natural family bonds; 7) Florida's dependency proceedings are formal
accusatory proceedings where: the state is always represented, the for-
mal rules of evidence are employed, a guardian ad litem represents the
child, and every interest but the parent's is represented by counsel. Psy-
chological, medical and sociological evidence is used; 8) issues adjudi-
cated in Florida's dependencies are speculative and far-reaching; 9) un-
represented parents lose custody of their children more often than
parents who are represented; and 10) proceedings entailing substantive
adjudications of fundamental liberty interests require counsel abso-
lutely, while proceedings involving placement on the basis of previous
substantive adjudications require counsel on a case by case basis.148The
mandate of the Fifth Circuit in Davis had been stayed pending a peti-
tion for review by writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. This petition was denied January 10, 1984.149
In examining other right to counsel cases in Florida, a similar con-
fusing array of decisions is evident. In In re D.B. and D.S.,150 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court required trial judges to appoint counsel for parents
whenever permanent termination of parental rights might result or
when the proceedings, by their nature, might lead to criminal child
146. Id. at 518-22.
147. Id. at 524.
148. Id. at 525-32.
149. Cert. den. sub nom Davis v. Gladstone, 52 U.S.L.W. 3503 (Jan. 10, 1984).
150. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
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abuse charges. 151 This result is compelled by the federal Constitu-
tion.152 In all other cases, trial judges are required to use all available
legal aid services and when these services are unavailable, to request
private counsel to provide the necessary services. 15 3
A case closely analogous to In re D.B. and D.S., is In re Hutch-
ins.154 The Florida Supreme Court in Hutchins considered the previous
"ungovernability" classification contained in Florida law. That statute
provided that a child who committed a second act of ungovernability
could be adjudicated delinquent."5 In re Gault"5' had long ago estab-
lished the child's right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding. The
Florida Supreme Court explained that the right to counsel was not
mandatory at the first hearing on ungovernability, because that first
hearing was not necessarily the first step in an adjudication of delin-
quency, depending upon the conduct of the child.157 But the court con-
cluded that it was impermissible to base an adjudication of un-
governability for the second time on a previously conducted hearing in
which the child was not represented by counsel. 58 It stated that the
first adjudicatory hearing is a "critical first step" in the delinquency
proceeding and the accused is entitled to all due process rights at each
step in the procedure. 59 De novo review at a subsequent hearing in
which all the. facts of the first ungovernability hearing were reheard
does not provide adequate constitutional safeguards since the first adju-
dication remains an essential element of delinquency.6 0
The Florida dependency scheme is similar to the former un-
governability scheme in that there are a series of "critical first steps,"
beginning with detention and ending with permanent commitment.''
151. Id. at 90.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 92. The Florida Attorney General has argued that because all adjudi-
cations of dependency threaten a parent with permanent termination of parental rights
and the possibility of criminal charges, State law already sweeps more broadly than
Lassiter (Brief in opposition ot Petition for Certiorari,Davis v. Gladstone, 52 U.S.L.W.
3503 (Jan. 10, 1984).
154. 345 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
155. Id. at 706.
156. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
157. 345 So. 2d at 706.
158. Id. at 707.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.401, 30.402, 39.404, 30.408, 39.41 (1980).
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The seriousness of this issue is illustrated by In re C.M.H.16 2 In this
case the Florida First District Court of Appeal held that the original
adjudication of abuse, neglect and abandonment was sufficient to form
the basis for subsequent permanent commitment without further
proof.16 3 While this decision may be constitutionally invalid under
Santosky v. Kramer,1 " and has been somewhat clarified by In re
A.B.,16 5 the original adjudication of dependency is still a critical stage
in any subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights.
In Hutchins terms, initial dependency proceedings are "critical
first steps" because they may result in permanent commitment at a
subsequent hearing. The issue of parental unfitness is substantively ad-
judicated in the initial adjudicatory hearing. As Judge Vance pointed
out in Davis, due process absolutely requires counsel in proceedings en-
tailing substantive adjudications of fundamental liberty interests. 66
Lower court decisions on the right to counsel in Florida include Alton
v. Conklin, which holds that parents have a right to counsel whenever
their child may be committed to an institution;167 In re R.W., which
holds that parents have a right to counsel at the time of a stipulation as
to an adjudication of dependency;"6 " and A.T.P. v. State, which holds
that parent and child have a right to counsel at detention hearings that
are akin to summary adjudications.1 69 A permanent commitment order
was overturned in In re R.W.H. when the record did not reveal the
mother's intelligent waiver of counsel.170
After considering these decisions, it appears that Florida trial
courts must pursue the following analysis at a minimum: 1) the paren-
tal interest at stake; 2) the state interest at stake; 3) the risk of an
erroneous decision; 4) the formality and complexity of the proceeding;
5) the likelihood of use of medical, psychological or sociological evi-
dence; 6) the likelihood that a child will remain at home or with rela-
tives as opposed to removal from the home; 7) the possibility of crimi-
nal child abuse charges; 8) the possibility of a subsequent permanent
commitment; 9) the presence of a stipulation; and 10) the possibility
162. 413 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
163. Id. at 427.
164. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
165. 9 FLA. L.W. 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1983) (No. AQ-331).
166. 714 F.2d at 533.
167. 421 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
168. 429 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
169. 427 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
170. 375 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
[Vol. 8
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 4
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss2/4
Florida's Dependent Child
that the child may be committed to an institution.
The complexity of this formula leads to the conclusion that the
absolute right to counsel conferred by statute would avoid the expense
of judicial decision making on a case-by-case basis and its endless ap-
pellate litigation. The two state statutes reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court in Lassiter 17 and Santosky17 2 require court appointed
counsel at adjudication. In enacting right to counsel legislation, Florida
would join a host of sister states, such as New York and North Caro-
lina. The Supreme Court in Lassiter reminds us that wise public policy
and informed opinion holds that appointed counsel is necessary not only
in permanent commitment proceedings but in neglect and dependency
proceedings as well.'7 3 The proposed amendment will simplify judicial
decision making and will bring Florida in line with the national trend
towards an absolute right to counsel.
E. The Standard of Proof for Permanent Commitment
The final family preservation issue currently facing Florida is the
standard of proof required at permanent commitment hearings. Flor-
ida's statute has never specified a standard. Until recently, appellate
courts had consistently ruled that clear and convincing proof of 1) pa-
rental unfitness and 2) the manifest best interests of the child were
required at permanent commitment hearings. 174
Last year, however, the First District Court of Appeal interpreted
the existing Florida statute in In re C.M.H., holding that only the man-
ifest best interests of the child need to be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence in order to terminate parental rights.1 75 The initial
adjudication of dependency (by a lower standard of proof than clear
and convincing), the court decided, made the issue of parental unfitness
res judicata in a subsequent proceeding to terminate parental rights.176
Because the appellate court's ruling in C.M.H. does not meet the stan-
dards of constitutional due process, set forth by the Supreme Court in
171. 453 U.S. 927 (1981).
172. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
173. Id.
174. See Carlson v. State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In Re
D.A.H., 309 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
175. 413 So. 2d 418, 425 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
176. 413 So.2d at 425.
1984]
29
Zawisza and Williams: Florida's Dependent Child: The Continuing Search for Realistic St
Published by NSUWorks, 1984
Nova Law Journal
Santosky,17 and because the current statute is silent as to this impor-
tant issue, this topic is currently ripe for legislative action.
Parental rights can be terminated upon a showing that the parent
has abandoned, abused, or neglected the child or has failed to substan-
tially comply with a performance agreement, and that permanent com-
mitment is manifestly in the best interests of the child.17 8 Dispositional
hearings are more relaxed than adjudicatory hearings. The present
statute is silent as to whether the formal rules of evidence are applied
at a permanent commitment hearing. Florida courts had repeatedly
held that a finding of permanent commitment must be based on clear
and convincing evidence both as to present parental unfitness and as to
the best interests of the child 179 until In re C.M.H. was decided.
"Clear and convincing" is a higher legal standard than the more-
likely-than-not standard of a "preponderance of the evidence" which
applies at dependency adjudications and in most civil actions. Clear
and convincing, however, is not as high a legal standard as the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" applicable in criminal proceedings. The United
States Supreme Court in Santosky ruled that proof of parental unfit-
ness by a mere preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional.18 0
The Court stated that applying a standard of proof "no greater than
that necessary to award money damages in an ordinary civil action"
failed to meet the requirements of due process and to adequately pro-
tect the parent's fundamental constitutional interest in the future of his
family unit.8 ' In analyzing New York's termination statute, the Su-
preme Court said that the findings of permanent neglect may be made
only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 82 At that stage
of the proceedings, the natural parents are pitted against the state and
the only issue is the unfitness of the parents. Because the consequences
of permanent commitment are so severe, and because, at this fact-find-
ing stage both parent and child share interest in avoiding the erroneous
termination of parental rights, only a clear and convincing evidence
standard can adequately allocate the risk between the family's interests
and the state's interests.1 83 The Supreme Court emphasized that at this
177. 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982).
178. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(b) (1979).
179. See In re C.K.G., 365 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Carlson v.
State, 378 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
180. 455 U.S. at 749, 102 S. Ct. at 1402.
181. 455 U.S. at 752, 759.
182. 455 U.S. at 748-49.
183. Id.
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stage the question of whether it would be in the best interests of the
child to return home is not at issue.18 4 The Court noted that even if
permanent commitment is denied, the child's placement in foster care
can still be maintained.185
Santosky is not cited in the opinion of In re C.M.H., nor is the
constitutional due process issue analyzed. To date, no Florida court has
clearly addressed the requirements of Santosky, but it is evident that
the statutory interpretation arrived at in C.M.H. cannot withstand judi-
cial scrutiny in light of Santosky. In the process of substantially revis-
ing Florida's dependency statute, provisions relating to permanent com-
mitment should be amended to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision in Santosky v. Kramer. Revising the statute will ensure that
future permanent commitment proceedings will not be subject to a re-
versal on constitutional grounds, and will provide finality to the perma-
nent commitment process.
V. Conclusion
The current efforts of the Florida legislature to revise the state's
dependency laws offer tremendous opportunities for progress. Looking
back at previous efforts to forge realistic standards helps identify the
problems and pitfalls in the child welfare system and these laws' consti-
tutional foundations. Previous Florida efforts have provided an opportu-
nity to test and retest solutions. The federal Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act offers new solutions along with financial aid to the
state. In its effort to reform, Florida should, in caution, remember the
cherished American values of family autonomy and privacy and the
limitations of state intervention in family life. In the search for realistic
and consistent standards in the emotion-laden area of dependency law,
the only standard which has endured the test of time, social change,
and varying economic conditions is the standard of family preservation.
184. 455 U.S. at 754-56.
185. Id.
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